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Abstract—This paper explores how the safety engineering 
practices applied to the aircraft design can be effectively 
associated to the MBSE. Requirements and procedures of the 
ARP4754/ED-79 and ARP4761 were considered. As an example 
the fuel system of a civil aircraft was used. Some key issues were 
found relevant, whilst modeling the system through the MBSE 
tools. The management of both the functional and dysfunctional 
analysis, leading to the Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) of the 
whole aircraft, within the same modeling environment was tested. 
The elicitation of safety requirements with a direct link to the 
FTA and FMEA used to quantify the risk of failure was 
performed. The software tools which can be interoperated for 
those tasks were tested. As a result, the integration between the 
two above mentioned analyses looks fairly easy. In fact, further 
efforts are required to make fully interoperable the tools 
currently available to perform this activity and to include the 
human interaction with the analyzed system. 
Keywords—Model Based Systems Engineering, Machine 
Design, Numerical methods, Functional Analysis, Risk analysis, 
System reliability and safety. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A main goal of the Model Based Systems Engineering 
(MBSE) is the safety assurance in critical systems. To be 
assumed as a main reference for the design, the MBSE needs 
to be fully integrated with the tools of the Safety engineering.  
Aeronautics is a typical application of safety critical systems 
with an increasing complexity, associated to the number of 
subsystems connected, of functions exploited and of interfaces 
[1]. A bright integration among subsystems and components is 
strictly required to assure a suitable level of safety and to 
comply with the homologation of the aircraft product [2]. It is 
known that the high level of complexity generally might 
increase the risk of failure, without a suitable prevention and a 
careful reliability assessment. Those motivations led to the 
requirements expressed by the Recommended Practices 
ARP4754/ED-79 [3] and ARP4761 [4]. They define a process 
to provide all the relevant information to certify the safety of 
complex and highly integrated aeronautic systems. 
Nevertheless, daily practice demonstrated that processes and 
definitions of those standards led to several interpretations and 
slightly different implementations, depending on the 
manufacturer [5] or even upon the technical domain [6]. Clear 
statements about functions, interfaces, hierarchy of control 
functions and safety based trade–off of the proposed layouts 
are needed. As it looks evident the Systems Engineering can 
greatly support that activity as it is discussed in this paper. In 
particular, the aim is that of assessing a procedure to perform 
the safety analysis of the system, through the tools of the 
MBSE [7,8], suitable for homologation according to the 
standards of civil aircrafts [2]. The development of this 
analysis basically deals with an integration between the usual 
functional analysis performed in SE and the dysfunctional 
analysis used in safety engineering to quantify and prevent the 
risk of failure [10]. As an example the fuel system of a civil 
aircraft with two engines for 90 passengers equipped with an 
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) will be described. As it is known 
the fuel system is required to be highly reliable, to suitably 
perform in all of operating conditions foreseen by the aircraft 
design [11,12,13]. In addition its configuration must fit some 
requirements about the weight, cost and performance in 
service, as well as those of maintainability and availability. 
II. SAFETY ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 
The aim of safety analysis in design is that of defining 
suitable requirements to be fitted to comply with the needs of 
conformity to the manufacturer’s practice, technical standards 
and directives, homologation items and tests. The whole 
process to perform the safety analysis is described by the 
ARP4761. In practice, the aircraft functions and those of its 
systems should assure a risk degree compatible with the 
norms. The main activities are described in Fig.1. The safety 
analysis can be integrated within the MBSE approach, for 
instance by associating the above mentioned activities to the 
steps defined by the V–model, as the ARP4754A states 
(Fig.2). 
A key issue of this analysis is the so–called FHA 
(Functional Hazard Analysis), which was performed in the test 
case first at the aircraft level, then applied to the fuel system. 
According to the FHA, for each system function, failure 
modes, severity and risk associated are explored [14]. 
Obviously the safety targets are defined by fixing the degree 
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of severity and risk compatible with a safe operation as in 
other similar safety critical systems [15,16]. Once that all the 
requirements could be allocated to the system functions, and 
these are associated to subsystems and components, the FHA 
has to be performed for all of those. If the MBSE is applied 
this activity looks fairly easy. A preliminary functional 
analysis is performed thus identifying use cases, stakeholders, 
functions and architecture of the designed system. Then a 
dysfunctional analysis can be run, thus allowing a critical 
review of all the eventual failure modes. It might be noticed 
that this approach provides a clear outline to proceed 
straightforward, particularly during the concept design 
activity. Safety analysis is performed fairly fast through the 
FHA and is easily documented.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Main contents and tools of the safety analysis performed in 
aeronautical engineering (from ARP 4761)[4]. 
 
Fig. 2. Integration of the tasks of safety analysis within the V-diagram of the 
Systems Engineering (from ARP 4754A) [3]. 
III. FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS 
As the FHA is performed, all the failure modes of the 
system functions are identified. Failure conditions are 
evaluated for both single and multiple events, in normal and 
degraded environment. Effects of failures are then defined and 
classified. Some requirements to be associated to the failure 
conditions are then defined and their coverage in allocation is 
finally checked. In the test case, the FHA at the aircraft level 
was provided as an input of the modeling of the fuel system. 
Functions included were mainly referenced to the ARP 4754. 
Many of those may affect the behavior of the fuel system. 
Among all, for instance, the thrust, self-piloting, data 
monitoring and recording, electric power, internal and external 
connections and energy conversion were analyzed. For each 
function, four states were considered in failure condition. A 
severe failure occurs in case of total or partial loss of the 
function, while less dangerous is considered an error signal. 
Moreover, a function might be performed too early or too late. 
In addition, failure might be either detected or not.  
Once that the failure modes are defined, a relevant task is 
investigating the severity of effects. This activity might be 
very difficult, since associating a too severe consequence to a 
dysfunction might turn out into a stringent requirement, as 
well as under evaluating the severity of a failure might affect 
the overall safety of the system. This difficulty could be 
overcome through the System Engineering. It provides the 
functional analysis, puts in evidence the stakeholders and the 
use cases and allows tracing the effect of a failure through the 
product development from the constructed part to the 
corresponding function and requirement.  
The FHA was formalized in the test case to be integrated 
with the MBSE approach. Some degrees of severity of the 
failure modes were set up. They were evaluated by 
considering in sequence the absolute safety of system, its 
operational capability, effects on the crew, effects on 
passengers. Catastrophic is the dysfunction preventing 
continued safe flight and landing, thus leading  to the death of 
humans, inhibiting some important operational capability or 
causing even injuries to crew to be urgently treated. 
Hazardous is each event decreasing significantly the safety 
margins, increasing the amount of work produced by the 
system or affecting a number of other functions, or even 
strongly tiring the crew or causing injuries not requiring an 
immediate treatment for the occupants. A major dysfunction 
for the aircraft allows it cruising and landing safely and 
significantly increases the work of crew. Less relevant 
dysfunctions might be classified either as minor or irrelevant, 
depending on the appreciable reduction of safety margins. 
TABLE I.  SAFETY TARGETS AND REQUIREMENTS 
Degree Probability per flight hour 
Catastrophic < 10-9 
Hazardous 10-9< x < 10-7 
Major 10-7< x < 10-5 
Minor 10-5< x < 10-3 
Irrelevant (no effect)  10-3 <  
To complete the FHA the probability of occurrence was 
associated to each degree of severity of failure (Tab.1). This 
action immediately allowed writing the corresponding safety 
requirements.  
IV. REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS 
The elicitation of requirements for the fuel system in the 
test case was driven by two parallel set of needs. Safety 
requirements were directly derived from the results of the 
FHA applied to the aircraft first, then on the system. 
Functional requirements were found by means of the 
functional analysis performed in IBM Rhapsody®. It is 
worthy noticing that some goals were assumed as needs: 
redundancy of critical functions, automatic monitoring with 
warning capabilities, location of commands preventing any 
accidental activation, double signal transmission. The 
requirement analysis was performed by following the standard 
IEEE 1220 [17]. Therefore, their attributes are specific, 
measurable, suitable, feasible and traceable, as is required by 
that standard. Additional requirements were written to fit the 
standard ASD S 1000 D (former ATA 100) [18]. To digitalize 
those requirements the IBM Rational DOORS® tool was used. 
V. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Typical diagrams of the System Modeling Language 
(SysML) were drawn to perform the functional and 
operational analysis of the system [19]. As a matter of fact, in 
the test case which includes several material components to be 
either assembled or connected to constitute the system, some 
questionable issues were found in the MBSE as is known in 
the literature. For instance, the sequence of diagrams and their 
topology might have an impact on a straight implementation 
of the approach. According to the Harmony© approach 
proposed by IBM [20] and widely used to run the Rhapsody® 
tool, functional analysis can be performed by following some 
alternate paths. 
Provided that a preliminary definition of requirement 
diagrams is performed and behavioral diagrams (use cases, 
activity, sequence, state machine) are drawn before the 
architectural diagrams, including block (BBD) and internal 
black diagrams (IBD), respectively, to perform the functional 
analysis, after the use cases, sequences, activities and IBD 
together with the state machine diagrams can be used. 
Alternatively, activities can be drawn before the sequences or 
even the state machine diagram can be used to derive the other 
ones. This choice is up to the user, but effectiveness of the 
software implementation changes as it might change the 
impact of the proposed MBSE approach on the existing 
practices of the technical domain.  
In the test case, the fuel system was easily described by 
resorting to the use cases and the sequences of actions 
performed in operation, thus allowing a natural derivation of 
activities and states. Some use cases were dedicated to a 
dysfunctional behavior, according to the FHA, by 
implementing the approach described in Fig.2. It was 
remarked that many requirements could be assessed and 
refined and others added by completing this task. Moreover, 
the path followed in drawing the diagrams looked the most 
suitable to be compatible with the tradition of the aeronautical 
domain and to describe the dysfunctions, since it was 
sufficient negating the operations defined in the sequence 
diagrams to create several dysfunctional behaviors.  
Some critical issues in the proposed architecture were 
detected thanks to the dysfunctional analysis, which helped in 
updating the Functional Breakdown Analysis of the fuel 
system. 
A. Use cases 
When a safety analysis is integrated with the functional 
analysis of the system, a more general interpretation of the use 
case is applied. Instead of only a goal to be achieved by the 
system, which usually involves as a stakeholder more the 
users than other subsystems, a use case might be even 
considered an action performed by the stakeholder, without a 
specific request. As an example, the engines feeding (Fig. 3) 
might be seen a logic action operated simply by changing 
some parameters in the FCU (Fuel Control Unit) [21]. 
However, this interpretation makes the engine a sort of a 
shadow stakeholder, poorly considered in the dysfunctional 
analysis. If the engine is considered as a regular stakeholder, 
all of functions, connections, errors are activated and 
dysfunctional paths can be easily defined. In the test case, for 
instance, the fuel storage performed by the tank, according to 
the SE literature, cannot be assumed as function since the tank 
does not require to the system to be filled nor the system 
requires to store the fuel. Therefore, the tank is a sort of 
service, poorly compatible with the role of stakeholder. 
However, if it is assumed to be a component of the fuel 
system, whose use case is store the fuel, in case of 
permeability of the tank structure dysfunction of fuel loss can 
be foreseen and analyzed. 
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Fig. 3. Use case diagram, with special operational use case highlighted. 
As it could be remarked in the test case, safety analysis 
affects the definition of the use cases. This happened for the 
heating control. It was found after a preliminary elicitation of 
requirements that a control of the temperature of the stored 
fuel is required and temperature cannot be below a define 
threshold in operation, to assure a prompt use. The hydraulic 
system plays the role of stakeholder in the heat exchange, 
since it provides the required amount of heat to the fuel tank. 
This refinement was added after identifying a critical issue in 
the dysfunctional analysis of the fuel system. As usual, the 
functional analysis was performed in IBM Rhapsody® by 
resorting to the connection between IBM DOORS® and 
Rhapsody® through the existing gateway, which assures a 
synchronization of contents. 
B.  Use cases realization 
The realization of use cases is aimed at investigating the 
system behavior case by case and at identifying the functions 
exploited. This task is usually based on the sequence 
diagrams, which highlight the functions performed and the 
stakeholders involved in each one. It is worthy noticing that 
they can be used for both the functional and dysfunctional 
analyses. An example of negation of a function is shown in 
Fig.4. Moreover, in the test case it was demonstrated that a 
preliminary set-up of functional sequence diagrams allows 
identifying all the critical issues for an eventual dysfunction, 
thus driving the dysfunctional analysis. A difference between 
a functional and dysfunctional sequence diagram is that to 
describe a dysfunction often it is required to resort to several 
additional details or links and some more functions. They 
increase the nodes of possible failure in the related 
architecture of the system, which have to be enclosed inside 
the FHA. 
 
[Refuel_flow_supplier_connected_to_tanks_filler_points]opt
Refuel flow
supplier
«External,Function,Block»
ENVTanks venting
«Function,Block»
Fuel storage
«Function,Block»
Refuel_flow
Refuel_flow
Sensing detection
No_fuel_level_measure
«Block,Function»
Fuel_level
Fuel quantity
indication
«Function,Block»
ENVGroundcrew
«Person»
Stop_refuel_flow()
Start_refuel_flow()
Gravity refuel flow = 0
Nominal gravity 
refuel flow-
pressure 
characteristic.
 
Fig. 4. Dysfunctional scenario related to a lack of measurement of the fuel level during a feed by gravity 
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Fig. 5. Activity diagram used for the dysfunctional analysis of the system. 
C. Activities and swimlanes 
Activity diagrams were then drawn to complete the 
description of the system behavior. Action flows are there 
shown, thus allowing immediately to identify a dysfunction 
wherever the flow is stopped (Fig.5). The role of each 
function or capability can be easily highlighted and further 
analyzed in this diagram by resorting to the columns, thus 
describing the so–called “swimlanes”. The connection with 
stakeholders can be represented as well. 
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Fig. 6. Functional breakdown structure of the system. 
VI. PRODUCT DESIGN  
A. Functional breakdown structure 
According to the MBSE to avoid a pure repetition of the 
layouts already applied in a previous version of the product, 
a good practice consists of dividing the architecture 
definition into three steps. Functions to be required to the 
system can be suitably defined by a breakdown structure 
and then instantiated into a logical architecture, being 
different from the real architecture since for each function 
only a generic device or subsystem capable to perform it is 
included instead of the real and material component, which 
will contribute to compose the system assembly. In the test 
case it was realized that the Functional Breakdown Structure 
(FBS) might be enriched if the functional analysis is 
performed in parallel with the dysfunctional one. In 
particular, control functions were detailed, as is shown in 
Fig.6. 
B. Logical architecture 
The system operation can be preliminarily described by 
the logical architecture of the system. It allows the transition 
between the functional and the physical modeling of the 
system. Usually physical blocks are there not yet 
represented, while the allocation of system functions to 
logical blocks, which will be then allocated to subsystems, 
components and parts in a next step (Fig.7), is described. A 
logical block is used to identify the relation between a 
certain operational task and the components of the system 
involved. Each logical block is already an active entity like 
a device, no more a pure function, not yet a real component. 
In practice a preliminary layout of the system architecture is 
drawn, without forcing the designer to select the 
corresponding components. The logical architecture can be 
also helpful to provide a preliminary system breakdown 
suitable for the first allocation of the reliability of the 
system, whilst the real prediction will be performed thanks 
to the Product Breakdown Structure (PBS), as described in 
Section VI.C. 
 
Fig. 7. Logical blocks of the system. 
C. Product breakdown structure 
Once that the FBS and the logical blocks could be 
enriched according to results of the dysfunctional analysis, a 
preliminary Product Breakdown Structure (PBS) can be 
drawn as in Fig.8. It includes some new components 
introduced into the FBS and fits the requirements of 
allocation of the logical blocks description. Each physical 
block might allocate several logical blocks, while a logical 
block must be allocated uniquely on a physical one. This 
criterion allows reducing the number of components used, 
the failure modes and the system complexity. It is worthy 
noticing that this approach fails in case of required 
redundancy of the system. From this point of view if the 
safety analysis drives towards the application of a 
redundancy, the allocation between function, logical block 
and physical blocks might be affected. In the test case it was 
found that, according to the standards ATA some 
components were necessarily added (Fig.8). Moreover, 
some safety requirements might suggest to introduce 
additional components, like in test case it was the heat 
exchanger for the heat transfer between the hydraulic and 
the fuel system. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Portion of the Product breakdown structure of the system with 
additional blocks. 
D. System architecture 
The above mentioned rationale led in the test case to  
define the overall architecture of the fuel system. According 
to the ATA standards three subsystems were introduced. A 
fuel storage, a fuel feeding, a fuel monitoring and 
management.  
A preliminary system layout was proposed, including 
two tanks, located inside the wings, each one capable of 
storing 3185 l (approximately 2500 kg) and accessible from 
the upper surface of each wing through two gates. In regular 
service each engine shall receive the fuel from the nearest 
tank. To prevent any problem in case lack of gravity, each 
tank is equipped with a small fuel reservoir of about 200 l 
(feeder compartment), always full and connected to an 
electric pump and to a jet pump. The first one is used during 
the engine start-up operation, then the jet pumps are 
automatically activated.   The electric pumps automatically 
are switched on when pressure of fuel goes below 350 mbar, 
thus assuring the fuel feeding. A cross-feed valve, being 
controlled by an electromechanical actuator, allows feeding 
the fuel to both the engines, through the same pump, in case 
of emergency, or to connect the right engine to the left 
pump and vice versa. A second valve is applied to each 
tank, to stop the fuel feeding and to prevent the risk of fire. 
If the minimum amount of fuel of 160 kg is detected in one 
tank, the related electric pump automatically starts. Some 
heat exchangers allow keeping the temperature of fuel under 
control and transferring the heat to the hydraulic system.  
Re-fueling on ground is operated through a main 
connector, located just close to a landing gear. A piping 
system distributes the fuel through the aircraft, until that the 
maximum level in each tank is reached, then the refueling 
valve automatically is closed. A backup system was added, 
in case the main control of fuel level does not suitably work. 
It consists of a sensor, being applied to the roof of each 
tank. It assures that a warning is sent to the operators and 
the pilot when the tank is full and that refueling is stopped. 
It might be remarked that a panel is applied close to the 
refueling connector to allow the ground operator monitoring 
the state of each valve, even in case of feeding by gravity. If 
an emergency landing is decided, refueling system is used to 
control to open the valves through a dedicated 
depressurizing device operating at 0,77 bar. 
A venting circuit assures that pressure be always 
positive during the whole mission profile. Each tank is 
pressurized through a venting valve connected to another 
one located at the end of the corresponding wing. This one 
is connected to the external environment through an air 
intake NACA, designed against the risk of ice accretion. 
The venting circuit is used even to prevent any risk 
associated to an accidental spill-out of fuel during the 
refueling operation. The upper part of the fuselage includes 
an empty and pressurized room, connected to the cross-
feeding circuit of the fuel system which allows controlling 
the steam present inside the system. 
A control system manages the fuel stored on the aircraft. 
A set of six sensors in each tank allows monitoring the fuel 
level in each tank. Their measurements are elaborated and 
displayed to the pilots. Additional magnetic sensors assure 
monitoring the fuel level even on ground. Temperature of 
the fuel system is always monitored and shown to the crew. 
A typical warning is activated when pressure in jet pumps is 
lower than 300 mbar, to indicate the lack of fuel or a failure 
occurring to the pumps. 
VII. FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS (FHA) 
Previous definition of the fuel system layout was 
performed through a functional analysis based on the MBSE 
approach. However, as is clearly remarked by the number of 
redundant devices foreseen in the proposed architecture, 
especially sensors, this system looks highly safety critical. It 
means that functional analysis might be incomplete and 
somehow unsuitable to detect all the risks associated to its 
operation and to refine both the list of requirements and the 
system layout. As it was previously described a 
dysfunctional analysis is associated to the functional one to 
perform a deeper investigation and to complete the trade-off 
of the system layout. 
The so-called Functional Hazard Analysis already 
performed at aircraft level (as in section 2.1) was developed 
for the fuel system. This action needs some preliminary 
activities: 
• system functions should be clearly defined as in the 
Functional Breakdown Structure (FBS); 
• interfaces with the operational environment should be 
known, as in the Use Case diagram; 
• functions of the super-system should be evenly known, 
i.e. in this case those of the whole aircraft; 
• related failure modes and conditions of the super-system 
should be already explored and detected through the 
FHA of the whole system, i.e. the aircraft; 
• system requirements should be defined and listed as in 
requirements list and diagrams, respectively.  
 
Fig. 9. Sketch of a typical layout of a fuel system similar to that forseen in 
the test case for a civil aircraft for regional connections. 
 
Fig. 10. Example of FTA for a failure event of tank esplosion. 
A main benefit of the MBSE applied to the test case was 
that FHA naturally flows if one looks at the FBS as well as 
at the other SysML diagrams previously drawn, especially 
to identify the system functions and interfaces. Practically, it 
was sufficient negating the actions foreseen in sequence and 
activity diagrams. Moreover, safety engineering procedures 
can be easily performed by all of involved operators since 
the models are shared through a platform among all. From 
the point of view of scenarios and missions starting from the 
use cases, linking each failure condition to a specific and 
known flight phase helps a lot. Designer should avoid 
detailing too much in this activity the contents of the FHA, 
as it could be easily the case,  because of the availability of 
those functional diagrams.  
The FHA allows deriving the safety requirements for the 
system. Failure modes simultaneously are the high level 
failure condition to start the derivation of the Fault Tree 
Analysis  (FTA) [10,22], as in Fig. 10. 
VIII. SYSTEM SAFETY ASSESSMENT (SSA) 
Once that the dysfunctional analysis is ready, as it happens 
in case of the heterogeneous simulation for the prediction of 
the dynamic behavior of system after the functional, for 
instance, an interoperation with the System Safety 
Assessment (SSA) is performed, to enable a verification of 
the safety requirements. 
The SSA consists of a systematic analysis of the 
architecture to link all the dysfunctions previously identified 
by the FHA to safety requirements. This activity needs a 
preliminary verification plan, based on the severity of each 
failure as the ARP4761 describes. In particular, in this work 
it was done by following some criteria as: the function type, 
its severity, the flight step in which the failure occurs and 
the complexity of the subsystem or component analyzed. 
According to that approach, it is relevant resorting to the 
classification of degrees described in Table 1. Dangerous 
and catastrophic events are usually more deeply analyzed. 
A. FTA 
Each failure condition detected by the FHA leads to 
verify the corresponding safety requirements. To perform 
this activity, the FTA is used. Starting from a main failure 
event, all the related failures are detected through the 
connections present inside the system and the interfaces 
according to a sort of "top-down" screening as in Fig.10. 
This analysis resorts to the hierarchic structure of the 
system. Therefore, the functional and dysfunctional analyses 
performed through the BBD and IBD immediately support 
this action. In case of the explosion of a tank, for instance, it 
could be possible detecting the tree of faults easily by 
considering the use cases and the proposed system 
architecture. 
B. FMECA 
A quantitative evaluation of risk is possible when the 
cause and effects analysis is performed, by creating the 
homonymous FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) 
[10]. To introduce some metrics inside the FTA, failure 
rates have to be identified, component by component, as 
well as their reliability. If one assumes that those values are 
constant over time, at least in this step of the analysis, a 
FMEA report can be linked to the functional model and then 
used to fit requirements of the ARP4761. Relevant inputs 
are the component identification number and name, the 
failure modes foreseen, a description of effects, tools to 
detect the failure, to measure their severity and to repair, 
when possible. 
Once that the FMEA is completed, failure rates can be 
easily derived by looking at the FTA. Moreover, there is a 
time of exposure to the detected risk. In the test case, for 
many components it simply corresponds to the time of 
flight, since this subsystem is highly critical, the failures 
severe and the consequences mainly dangerous or even 
catastrophic. In some cases other values were set up, 
according to the literature herein indicated. The 
interoperability in this case is played with the software used 
to define the above mentioned values, i.e. the RAM-
COMMANDER®. Each FTA allows computing the 
probability of failure associated to the main event at the top, 
through the Boolean algebraic function described by the 
tree.  
It might be considered that those approaches can benefit 
of other currently developed within the frame of computer 
science and information technology. Even in this field a full 
interoperability of tools is looked for. Some examples of 
reliability analysis linked to a system dynamic behavior was 
already proposed by resorting to Modelica® as a tool for a 
full safety analysis [24]. Moreover, structured reliability 
analysis and safety assurance processes are currently 
developed and tested to be used in connection with the 
MBSE and related tools. They could be integrated with the 
process above described, to enrich and complete the tool 
chain and create a suitable platform to support the overall 
system development [25].    
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A challenging issue to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the Model Based Systems Engineering in developing and 
integrating mechanical and aeronautical systems is using its 
tools to enhance the elicitation and the verification of safety 
requirements. Actually the analyzed test case of the fuel 
system for a civil aircraft demonstrated that coverage and 
traceability of requirements can be greatly improved by 
using the MBSE. Safety engineering basically needs a clear 
definition of functions, interfaces and hierarchies in the 
system layout to proceed with a straight evaluation of failure 
modes and their propagation in terms of effects upon the 
whole system. Functional modeling allows developing a 
dysfunctional analysis, which helps in detecting the failure 
modes and defining the corresponding safety requirements. 
A key activity is the Functional Hazard Analysis, which 
might easily be performed by following the information 
described by the behavioral and architectural diagrams of 
the MBSE. Moreover, safety analysis requires a quantitative 
prediction of risk and of the related probability of 
occurrence. In this second step of the activity it might be 
noticed that FTA and FMEA are supported by the MBSE, 
never substituted, although functional modeling allows 
deriving fairly easily the contents of those analyses. A better 
correlation between the FHA of the whole aircraft and of the 
fuel system was even found. Critical issues at the interface 
between those two systems could be even detected. As a 
matter of facts, the designed fuel system demonstrated to be 
capable of feeding the required amount of fuel along a 
complete flight mission, for given pressure, temperature, 
altitude and scenario. Fuel level is continuously monitored 
[23] and fuel heating suitably controlled by heat exchangers. 
Interoperation between functional models, FMEA and FTA 
looks possible and effective, although a corresponding 
interoperation of related software has to be further tested. A 
future work could be focused on the effect of human 
mistakes in operation, i.e., upon including humans in the 
model, or even of multiple failures simultaneously 
occurring. 
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